Moscow Observer

Today on Novodevichy cemetery in Moscow is a burial ceremony of the first President of Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin.
Attempts to associate the certain time with prominent figures of recently deceased is a common approach in journalism. In case of Boris Yeltsin it is not an overstatement to say that he has to a large extent defined Russia during the volatile 90’s. Yeltsin will go down into the history books as Russia’s ultimate liberal ruler and a westernizer.

When aksed in 1993 which deed is he most proud of in his entire life, he said it was quitting the Communist Party, where he has successfully started his political career. Yeltsin wanted to be the opposite of what the communists were - he has performed a number of difficult reforms; particularly difficult and painful was the rapid transition from planned to market economy. He has liberated the press and was very tolerant to criticism from the outside. He has diminished the role of the KGB in public life and worked towards the creation civil society, manifesting itself through public participation in political processes that went on in the country.

Lots of reforms went wrong, the failed privatisation, as a result of which few became rich practically overnight, whereas the rest of the people felt they were cheated. The Chechen wars dragged on as a senseless bloodbath and a neverending partisan war, accompanied by terrorist acts on Russian territory. Due to these and other problems, Yeltsin was never particularly loved by the majority of Russia’s population. His alcoholism and countless anecdotes of his drinking-related failures on the international scene also did not add to his popularity.

As Gwynne Dyer stated:

I have seen President Boris Yeltsin drunk and I’m pretty sure I have seen him sober, but unless he does something obvious like singing or falling over, it takes a while to decide: both his body language and his speech patterns tend to blur the issue.

Perhaps, the main mistake that he has made in his life was annointing Putin as his direct successor. In retrospective, that was the one single deed that has overturned most of Yeltsin’s unquestionable political achievements.

Putin’s policies have largely destroyed what was left of Yeltsin’s political achievement. While Yeltsin was an innovator seeking to create and nurture a free Russia with public participation and a limited role for the state, Putin scrapped the fledgling institutions and political freedoms and pushed Russia back toward its traditional track: loyal bureaucrats instead of statesmen; and an omnipotent and forbidding state and an impotent society, deeply alienated from each other.

Masha Lipman in Washington Post, on Yeltsin’s legacy

In his last speech, Yeltsin said: “I want to say that I am sorry. I am sorry for the dreams that did not materialize.” The dreams of the young Russian democracy were his dreams too. He was a truly Dostoyevsky’s character, torn apart by various conflicting forces, feeling guilty for his inability to make system improvements. Both his strengths and weaknesses seemed blown out of proportion.

When prominent politicians die many say that they have marked a certain era. In this case I could not agree more.

Among the very few displays opposition’s existence can be seen in ongoing attempts from a coalition of independent non-conformist politicians “The Other Russia” (Drugaya Rossiya) to organise marches of protest. The main objective of the organisation lies in pursuit of fair State Duma elections of 2007 and the upcoming presidential elections of 2008. Among the most prominent members of the movement are former world chess champion Garry Kasparov, former minister of finance Mikhail Kasyanov and a liberal politician Irina Khakamada. The most important strategic goal of the coalition is nomination of a single candidate from the opposition in order to avoid the “Successor” scenario.

This appears to be an overly ambitious goal, considering that there is no effective way to reach the electorate in the nearly fully controlled Russian media environment. In fact, all the state channels are either ignoring the existence of the coalition or hinting at Western sponsorship of the movement. It is implied that no attempt to change the government can result in anything other than ongoing political chaos. An example of such scenario is the current constitutional crisis in Ukraine. It came as a blessing for Kremlin’s propagandists, who continuously argue about the excalating threat of “Orange plague” on Russian soil (stemming from the famous Orange Revolution of 2004-2005 in Ukraine).

Despite the relatively little publicity that the opposition’s marches are receiving, the public attendance are steadily growing in numbers. On the 16th of December 2006 about 4 thousand people gathered in Moscow, on the 3rd of March 2007 in St.Petersburg between 5 and 7 thousand people attended the meeting. Both events were accompanied by state police and police special forces, outnumbering the demonstrators. Furthermore, the event scheduled on March 24th in Nizhniy Novgorod was denied on the spot, resulting in arrest of nearly 300 people, while the organisers were charged as terrorists.

This is one of the examples of administrative overreaction, as the real impact of such protests can not possibly have such distructive effect on the system. In fact, Kasparov and his peers are mainly perceived as marginalised idealists, fighting a battle that can not possibly be won. The worrying factor lies in local administrations’ inability to evaluate the potential effect of such meetings, which is rather insignificant in the framework of battle for the mind of the electorate. Goliath isn’t scared of David, he is just overly cautious..

A short and precise article in The Guardian Online concerning the “Successor Project”.

The last week has brought a new landmark in this year’s politcal situation. The head of Russia’s Central Electoral Committee Alexander Veshnakov will no longer be a member of the Committee, as his name was not on the list of the five members proposed by President Putin. In reality that means that the head of Russia’s electoral system, who is known for his loyal pro-Putin politcal orientation, is being replaced by another, most probably even more loyal Kremlinist.

A number of liberal journalists have accused Alexander Veshnyakov of forging the electioal results of 2000 in order to avoid the second round of the elections. Allegedly, during the last hours of calculations the support of presidential candidate Putin has grown to nearly 100%. However, due to a lack of transparency in the electoral process these accusations can not be verified.
Even more alarming were other displays of subjectivity during electoral processes. A recent example of that would be the results of the draw, which was to determine the order in which political parties appear on the ballot sheet. In 8 out of 14 regions, where the results were supposed to be random and independent from each other, the ruling party “Edinaya Rossiya” (United Russia) received the first place in the ballot sheets. Accoring to theory, a probability of such outcome equals just 0.033%. This is a brilliant illutration to what is being referred to as “administrative resource”, or the ability of the local authorities’ to influence the electoral process on the spot.

Despite of being a pro-Putin man, Alexander Veshnyakov had a contrasting personal viewpoints on a number of new legislative initiatives proposed (and partially already passed) by the state Duma and it’s largest representative - “Edinaya Rossiya”. These include elimination of a required minimum voter turnout, re-introduction of voting ahead of time (known as a big lever for manipulation via the administrative resource), and others. It appears as if the Kremlin wants to re-ensure its control over the electoral process just in time for the upcoming Duma elections of 2007 and, most importantly, the presidential elections due in 2008.

One of the essential objectives of Russia’s foreign policy lies in retaining influence in the post-Soviet territories, which are now independent since the collapse of the Union in 1991. Among these, the Baltic states: Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia seek to eradicate any connection with Russia, joining the European Union and NATO. Most of the remaining republics became members of a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), a politically loose association undergoing gradual decline since the day it was established. Through the CIS Russia was looking to preserve its control over these territories by means of economic subsidiaries (for example in the form of cheaper energy supplies) in exchange for political loyalty from other member states. This concept has proved impossible in the long term; as a result of revolutions Georgia and Ukraine have chosen a far more Westernized course of development.

The situation with Belarus has traditionally been completely different. Instead of seeking integration into European structures, President Lukashenko’s main political objective has been revolving around close ties with Russia. There are at least two major reasons for that: firstly, after the widely disputed referendum held in 2004 (that effectively abolished limitations on presidential terms as specified in the constitution) Lukashenko has little contact with the West, which perceives him as an illegitimate ruler. Secondly, up to 40% of Belorussian budget is owed to Russia’s subsidized energy supply. Businesses may not be able to stay competitive in case they have to pay full price for oil and gas.

Russia and Belarus have made integration efforts - to much popular support on both sides due to nostalgia for the Soviet era. To the current Russian political elites it meant that Putin could stay in power for 8 more years, as the newly created country would could provide such an opportunity. Until the end of 2003 both countries were preparing this procedure, the Russian ruble was intended to be the only currency in both countries starting January 2005. To much surprise, Lukashenko then stated that he will now allow Belarus being demoted to being just a region in a bigger political unit. As most of commentators agree, this decision was dictated not as much by the national interest, as by personal political ambitions of Mr. Lukashenko, whose role would significantly diminish upon the unification.

As the union with Belarus bears no more political significance, Russia has decides to abandon subsidies to its former close ally. After a long and difficult negotiations the new formula of economic cooperation was agreed upon. It is a compromise that does not fully suit neither side, but a blow to Belarus’ economic stability may turn out to be severe. In the aftermath of the unsatisfying agreements president Lukashenko is threatening to revise the priorities of Belarus’ foreign policy. This implies a more pro-Western attitude, under the condition that the Europe accepts Belarus as it is at the moment.
Reuters:

Alexander Lukashenko told Reuters in a rare interview on Tuesday there was no question of agreeing to the EU’s “impossible demands” on free media, fair elections and the rule of law set last year as a condition for improving relations.

Lukashenko, in power since 1994 and accused by the EU and the United States of rigging elections, jailing opposition figures and shutting down dissident media, offered little prospect of change to his uncompromising style of government.

Kommersant:

In yesterday’s interview, however, Mr. Lukashenko slipped up by saying that he is ready to be friendly to the West only if he retains his grip on the reins of power. “Thus far, all of the demands made on Belarus have eventually been about how we should destroy our political system, and it is implied that the current president is illegitimate and should leave his post. What right does the West have to demand that?”

This requirement on Lukashenko’s side keeps the prospects of Europe-Belarus future cooperation dubious. It may, however, not even be the initial purpose. A more likely explanation lies in hopes that the Kremlin might want reconsider its current stand and keep one of the very few international allies. But whatever the intention is, it seems very unlikely that this rare display of Lukashenko’s openness to foreign press will bear fruit.

According to the annual ranking as calculated by the Freedom House (http://freedomhouse.org) Russia is holding its position among the group of not-free countries. The political freedoms in Russia, according to the study are similar to those in Gabon, Pakistan and Angola. Moreover, for the civil freedoms Russia has received the lowest grade possible, along with Cuba and North Korea. Although these estimates are arbitrary, the trend of sinking freedoms has been consistent for the past 7 years, during which Russia was on a political crusade of establishing the infamous “Vertical of Power” - a model of political management that implies minimum resistance to the decisions of the executive branch of government.

In practice it means less autonomy to the regions (the heads of local governments are no longer elected, instead they are appointed directly by the president) and total control over the State Duma (Parliament), including the parties that nominally are in the opposition. The benefit that this model is supposed to provide is increased efficiency of political decision-making. The fundamental flaw lies in complete lack of “checks and balances” needed for a functioning and healthy democracy.

As Joel Simon of the Committee to Protect Journalists writes describing such tendencies:

“The rise of “democratators”—popularly elected autocrats—is alarming because it represents a new model for government control of the press. These leaders stand for election and express rhetorical support for democratic institutions while using measures such as punitive tax audits, manipulation of government advertising, and sweeping content restrictions to control the news media. The democratators tolerate the façade of democracy—a free press, opposition political parties, an independent judiciary—while gutting it from within.”

To avoid the discrepancy between the declared democratic values and authoritarian governance the new term “Sovereign Democracy” was introduced in 2006 by the Kremlin’s ideologists. The core of this concept lies in the fact that the overwhelming majority of the population approves power-centralizing initiatives, thus making them democratic in the original sense (rule of people, or at least the majority). Commentators often declare that Western democracy is very far from the original Russian political traditions, which lie in innately autocratic realm.

A strong counterpoint to that would be that we now live in the age when the media by and large defines public opinion. Social and political attitudes are influenced by the information that populace is exposed to. Consequently, whoever is in control of the media is to a large extent in control of the public opinion. Hence the contemporary Russia is faced with a following circular logic:
the Kremlin is in control of the media > the media promotes Kremlin’s initiatives > the public supports these initiatives > the Kremlin states that since the general public approves of it, this system deserves to be labelled “democratic” and in addition is in line with Russian national political traditions. Thus, any research that indicates erosion of civil or political liberties is given little or no attention.